Executive Summary
Ransomware groups come and go. Gunra is different — it is organized, methodical, and expanding fast. On August 10, 2026, the FBI, CISA, NSA, and South Korea’s National Police Agency put out a joint advisory warning about this group. That does not happen for every ransomware gang. It happens when the threat is serious enough that governments feel the need to step in. Gunra has hit healthcare, banks, government agencies, manufacturers, and utilities across every major region. If your organization runs internet-facing infrastructure and has not heard of Gunra yet — this article is for you.

What Is Gunra?
Gunra launched in April 2025, built on leaked source code from Conti — one of the most sophisticated ransomware operations ever. By January 2026 it evolved into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), where a core team builds the tools and takes a cut while independent affiliates run the actual attacks.
A few things that make Gunra stand out:
- Demands typically exceed $10 million, with a 5–7 day payment window before stolen data goes public
- Targets both Windows and Linux systems — though the Linux variant has a flaw that may allow free decryption
- Recruits access brokers on dark web forums under the alias “Golden Community”
- Has confirmed infrastructure overlaps with North Korea’s Lazarus Group — though direct involvement is still unconfirmed
How Gunra Operates — From Entry to Encryption
This is the full attack from start to finish. One thing worth noting before you read this — by the time files are encrypted, everything in stages 1 through 6 has already happened. Encryption is the end, not the beginning.
| Stage | What Happens | Tools Used |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Get In | Exploit unpatched internet-facing devices, brute-force RDP or SSH, or buy access from a broker who already broke in somewhere | Known CVEs, credential stuffing, RDP brute force, IAB markets |
| 2. Go Quiet | Delete logs, wipe command history, use tools already on the system to avoid dropping anything suspicious | net.exe, wmic.exe, log wiping |
| 3. Spread | Move across the network toward domain controllers — the crown jewels of any Windows environment | psexec.py, secretsdump.py, Pass-the-Hash |
| 4. Break MFA | Modify authentication files on VDI portals so a specific attacker password always works — MFA is still “on” but completely neutralized | Direct file modification |
| 5. Steal Data | Pull documents, databases, emails, and PII before touching the encryptor — this is the leverage for double extortion | main.exe, 7-Zip, Rclone → MEGA |
| 6. Kill Backups | Delete shadow copies and target disaster recovery systems so there is no way to restore without paying | vssadmin, wmic, PowerShell |
| 7. Encrypt | Lock every file across every available drive, drop a ransom note in every folder | ChaCha20 + RSA-4096, .ENCRT extension, R3ADM3.txt |
The honest takeaway: Most organizations only realize something is wrong at stage 7. By then it is too late to prevent damage — you can only contain it. The rules below are designed to catch Gunra at stages 3, 5, and 6 — where you still have time to act.
Detection — What to Watch For
Here is a quick reference of all six detections, followed by each rule with a plain-English explanation:
| Stage | What to Detect | Log Source | Event IDs | Key Indicator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | Brute force + successful login | Windows Security | 4625 + 4624 | >10 failures then success within 5 min |
| Lateral Movement | Impacket psexec / secretsdump | Windows Security | 7045, 4662, 4624 | PSEXESVC service, DCSync GUIDs |
| MFA Bypass | Auth file modified on VDI | Sysmon | 11 | Write to \auth\, \mfa\, \otp\ by unexpected process |
| Exfiltration | Rclone pushing to MEGA | Sysmon | 1, 3 | rclone.exe with mega in args or destination |
| Backup Destruction | VSS deletion | Sysmon | 1 | vssadmin delete shadows or wmic shadowcopy delete |
| Encryption | .ENCRT files or ransom note | Sysmon | 11 | .ENCRT or R3ADM3.txt on disk |
Rule 1 — Brute Force Followed by Successful Login
Ten failed logins and then a sudden success on RDP is not a clumsy user —
it is a brute force that worked. This rule catches that pattern within a 5-minute window.
title: Gunra - RDP Brute Force Success logsource: product: windows service: securitydetection: failed: { EventID: 4625, LogonType: 10 } success: { EventID: 4624, LogonType: 10 } condition: failed | count() > 10 and success within 5mlevel: highEvent IDs explained:4625 — a login attempt failed4624 — a login succeededLogonType: 10 — this was a Remote Desktop (RDP) login specifically
Rule 2 — Impacket Lateral Movement
Impacket is a legitimate Python toolkit that attackers abuse heavily for moving across networks. Each of its three main tools leaves a specific fingerprint — this rule catches all three in one.
title: Gunra - Impacket Activitylogsource: product: windows service: securitydetection: psexec: { EventID: 7045, ServiceName: 'PSEXESVC' } dcsync: { EventID: 4662, Properties|contains: '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' } pth: { EventID: 4624, LogonType: 3, AuthenticationPackageName: 'NTLM' } condition: psexec or dcsync or pthlevel: high
What each part catches:
7045 + PSEXESVC— psexec.py always creates a service with this exact name. It is its calling card4662 + the GUID— secretsdump requests AD replication rights using this specific permission ID. That GUID appearing in logs means someone just tried to dump your domain credentials4624 + NTLM + LogonType 3— Pass-the-Hash shows up as a network login using NTLM authentication. Legitimate logins from modern systems mostly use Kerberos — NTLM network logins are worth questioning
Rule 3 — Authentication File Tampering
When Gunra tampers with MFA, they do it by modifying files inside authentication folders. This rule fires when any process outside of trusted Windows paths touches those files.
title: Gunra - Auth File Modifiedlogsource: product: windows service: sysmondetection: selection: EventID: 11 TargetFilename|contains: ['\auth', '\mfa', '\otp', '\login'] TargetFilename|endswith: ['.conf', '.cfg', '.dll', '.py'] filter: { Image|contains: ['\Windows\System32\', '\Program Files\'] } condition: selection and not filterlevel: critical
How the logic works:
EventID 11— Sysmon fires this every time a file is created or overwritten- The
filterexcludes trusted system paths — legitimate software updates come fromProgram FilesorSystem32. An attacker writing auth files will not be coming from there
Rule 4 — Rclone Exfiltration to MEGA
Rclone is a command-line tool for syncing files to cloud storage. There is almost no legitimate reason for it to be running on a corporate server and pushing data to MEGA. This rule catches it at two points — when it starts and when it connects.
title: Gunra - Rclone to MEGAlogsource: product: windows service: sysmondetection: process: { EventID: 1, Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe', CommandLine|contains: 'mega' } network: { EventID: 3, Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe', DestinationHostname|endswith: '.mega.nz' } condition: process or networklevel: critical
Why two conditions:
EventID 1catches the process launching with MEGA in its argumentsEventID 3catches the outbound network connection to mega.nz — useful if an attacker renames the rclone binary to something innocent-sounding
Rule 5 — Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
Shadow copies are Windows’ built-in backup snapshots. Gunra deletes them before encrypting so victims cannot restore without paying. This is your best early warning — VSS deletion happens before a single file is encrypted.
title: Gunra - VSS Deletionlogsource: product: windows service: sysmondetection: vssadmin: { EventID: 1, Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe', CommandLine|contains: 'delete shadows' } wmic: { EventID: 1, Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe', CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy delete' } ps: { EventID: 1, Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe', CommandLine|contains: 'Win32_Shadowcopy' } condition: vssadmin or wmic or pslevel: critical
Why three conditions: Attackers know that security teams write rules for vssadmin. So they switch to wmic. Then to PowerShell. Covering all three means they cannot simply swap tools to evade detection.
Rule 6 — Active Encryption
This is the last line of defense. If this fires, encryption is happening right now on that machine. There are zero false positives — no legitimate software creates .ENCRT files or drops R3ADM3.txt. Isolate the host the moment this triggers.
title: Gunra - Encryption in Progresslogsource: product: windows service: sysmondetection: selection: EventID: 11 TargetFilename|endswith: ['.ENCRT', 'R3ADM3.txt'] condition: selectionlevel: critical
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Stage | Technique | ID |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 |
| Initial Access | Valid Accounts — Brute Forced | T1078 |
| Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping | T1003.002 |
| Lateral Movement | Remote Services — SMB/PsExec | T1021.002 |
| Defense Evasion | Modify Authentication Process | T1556 |
| Defense Evasion | Clear Windows Event Logs | T1070.001 |
| Collection | Data from Cloud Storage | T1530 |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1567.002 |
| Impact | Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 |
| Impact | Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 |
What To Do Right Now
You do not need a massive security overhaul to reduce your exposure to Gunra. A few targeted actions go a long way:
- Patch everything internet-facing — VPNs, firewalls, remote access tools. Unpatched and exposed is all Gunra needs
- Get RDP off the internet — put it behind a VPN. If someone needs remote access, make them authenticate twice to get there
- Deploy Sysmon if you have not already — without it, rules 2 through 6 above are completely blind
- Question Rclone and 7-Zip on servers — if you see either running on a file server or database server and nobody scheduled it, treat it as an incident
- Block MEGA at DNS and proxy level — traffic to mega.nz from corporate devices has almost no legitimate use case
- Keep offline backups — if your backups are network-accessible, Gunra can reach them. If they are offline, they cannot
- Baseline your VDI auth files — know what they look like when healthy so you notice immediately when something changes
- Pull the STIX IOCs from CISA advisory AA26-222A and load them into your SIEM today
Final Thought
Gunra is not winning because it is technically unstoppable. It is winning because organizations are leaving doors open — unpatched devices, exposed RDP, no Sysmon, backups on the same network as everything else.
None of the detections in this article require expensive tooling. They require log visibility and a few well-placed rules. The attack chain Gunra uses is well-documented and consistent — which means defenders who know what to look for have a real advantage.
The question is whether you are watching before stage 7 or only finding out after it.
Full IOCs available in CISA Advisory AA26-222A and the joint advisory PDF.
Sources:
- #StopRansomware: Gunra Ransomware — CISA
- FBI, South Korea Warn of Gunra Ransomware — The Record
- Gunra Ransomware Exploits VPN Flaws — CybersecurityNews
- CISA Urges Organizations to Patch Against Gunra — GBHackers
- Warning Issued Over Gunra Ransomware — IT Pro
⚠️ Disclaimer: This article is intended for educational and defensive security purposes only. All detection rules and threat intelligence shared here are meant to help organizations protect themselves — not to enable malicious activity.

































